Medicines Security: From Supply Continuity to National Resilience

Executive argument

Medicines shortages are often treated as isolated procurement failures. In reality, they reveal the condition of a wider national system connecting science, manufacturing, regulation, logistics, capital, technology and public authority.

The strategic shift

A continuity model asks whether a product arrives. A resilience model asks whether institutions can anticipate exposure, absorb shocks, adapt operations and recover without unacceptable harm.

Policy priorities

Governments should identify critical medicines, map multi-tier dependencies, establish cross-government ownership, align procurement with resilience goals and exercise shortage scenarios.

Conclusion

Medicines security should be treated as a permanent national capability rather than an emergency project.

Evidence notes and limits

This perspective proposes an analytical framing; it does not report an empirical study, systematic review or validated measurement. The sources below provide policy context. MSI’s recommendations remain its own interpretation and do not imply source endorsement.

Selected references

• DHSC and NHS England (2025), Managing a robust and resilient supply of medicines · accessed 13 October 2026
• DHSC (2025), Accompanying data pack · accessed 13 October 2026

Authorship, interests and review

Institutional authorship: Medicines Security Institute. Enquiries and corrections are overseen by the Founder & Executive Director. Independent peer review is not claimed. This record has no verified publication-specific funding or conflict disclosure; readers may request clarification through the research office.

Read the expanded full working-paper manuscript (October 2026 draft) →

Version record

September 2026: introductory record. 13 October 2026: clarified publication type, aligned downloadable text, added source notes and review limits. Substantive research expansion will be separately dated and reviewed.