Governing Board
Sets direction, reserves material decisions and holds executive management accountable.
A governance architecture designed around public purpose, scientific credibility and institutional continuity, with a clear separation between oversight, advice and executive delivery.
Governance framework · Board, council and committee appointments will be announced following confirmation.
The governance framework places stewardship with a properly constituted governing board, scientific challenge with qualified independent advisers, and delivery with an accountable executive office. No individual, donor or commercial partner would have unilateral authority over research findings.
Sets direction, reserves material decisions and holds executive management accountable.
Provide scientific challenge and global perspective; advise without exercising executive control.
Implements approved strategy and reports delivery, finance, risk and integrity to the board.
The Governing Board's remit is to safeguard the Institute's purpose, independence, resources and long-term sustainability. Its legal powers must be established in the governing instrument.
Recommended initial composition: five to seven members, an independent chair and a majority independent of executive management and related commercial interests. Collectively, members should bring research, medicines policy, finance, governance and international experience.
Reserved matters: strategy and annual budget; executive appointment and appraisal; risk appetite; major commitments; related-party transactions; acceptance of material restricted funding; governance and succession.
Proposed quarterly meetings, annual effectiveness review and a recorded decision and conflicts register. Independent members should determine executive remuneration and matters concerning the executive's own interests.
An independent advisory council would challenge the research agenda, methods and quality of outputs across MSI's eight domains. Scientific advice would inform, rather than replace, governing-board accountability.
Proposed membership: experienced researchers and practitioners spanning pharmaceutical governance, supply chains, public health, economics, AI, policy and research methods, with disciplinary and geographical diversity.
Advise on research strategy, methodological standards, external review, evidence quality and research capacity. Funding interests must not determine scientific conclusions or publication decisions.
Advice, review recommendations and material concerns would be recorded and escalated to the governing board. Council membership would not imply endorsement by members' employers.
A non-executive advisory forum would bring international policy, health-system, industry and civil-society perspectives to the Institute's work.
Appointments should reflect a range of regions and medicines-system contexts. Members would serve in a personal advisory capacity under disclosed terms, with conflicts and external affiliations declared.
Provide strategic challenge, contextual intelligence and advice on international collaboration. The council would have no fiduciary, procurement, grant-award or executive decision-making authority.
The executive office would submit recommendations to the board where a formal decision is required. Advisory participation would not confer control over findings or editorial decisions.
Executive management would implement the board-approved strategy, organise research programmes and maintain operational accountability. The office would be led by the Executive Director within a documented scheme of delegation.
Capacity should develop proportionately across research leadership, grants and finance administration, operations, data stewardship and communications. Responsibilities must be assigned even where services are outsourced.
Deliver approved programmes and budgets, oversee staff and contractors, manage agreements and report delivery, financial position, risks and research-integrity concerns.
The Executive Director would report to the board. No executive should approve their own expenses, remuneration or related-party arrangements.
Three functions are proposed. At an early stage, the board may retain these responsibilities collectively under recorded terms, with independent specialist support. Separate committees should be activated when membership, competence and workload justify them.
Oversee budgets, financial controls, grant restrictions, procurement, anti-fraud measures, risk management and audit or independent financial review as applicable. Recommend material financial decisions to the board.
Oversee research conduct, conflicts, authorship, corrections, complaints and ethics arrangements. Obtain suitably independent ethics review before relevant research begins; this committee is not itself a substitute for required external approvals.
Maintain a skills matrix, transparent appointments, terms and succession. Oversee board evaluation and executive remuneration, excluding affected individuals from deliberation and decisions.
A proposed patient and public reference panel would contribute perspectives on access, equity and the practical consequences of medicines insecurity. Participation should be accessible, appropriately supported and governed by clear consent, confidentiality and remuneration arrangements. It would advise without taking on fiduciary or scientific approval responsibilities.
Use a published skills matrix, proportionate open selection and documented appointment decisions. Proposed non-executive terms are three years, normally renewable once, with staggered succession and annual independence declarations.
Maintain a register of interests, require meeting-specific declarations and recusal, and record independent approval of related-party arrangements. Share relevant commercial interests in grant and publication disclosures.
Assess funding sources and restrictions before acceptance. Agreements should preserve the right to publish, separate funding from editorial control and disclose support, limitations and competing interests.
Document protocols, data access, authorship, external review and correction routes. Obtain the permissions and independent ethics review appropriate to each project before collecting data.
Assign accountable budget holders, separate authorisation from payment and reconciliation, maintain project-level records and monitor restricted funds, subawards, procurement and reporting obligations.
Develop confidential reporting routes, independent escalation, non-retaliation and a fair complaints process. Publish an annual activity and governance statement with financial reporting appropriate to legal form and scale.
David Yusuf is a pharmacologist, senior HR and operations executive, and researcher in pharmaceutical governance specialising in medicines security. His work connects scientific reasoning, organisational capability, accountable leadership and the resilience of medicines systems.
As Executive Director, he leads the Institute's executive development and research agenda, bringing together its work in research, strategic intelligence, policy advisory and international collaboration. His research interests include artificial intelligence, pharmaceutical industrial strategy, supply-chain resilience and medicines security.
His executive role sits within the Institute's institution-led governance framework, with a focus on effective delivery, research integrity and long-term institutional credibility.
VIEW EXECUTIVE PROFILE CONTACT THE EXECUTIVE OFFICEExpressions of interest in governance, scientific advice and international collaboration are welcome. An enquiry is not an appointment or promise of funding.